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Abstract
With regard to the interrelationship between firm births and deaths, Johnson & Parker (1994,
1996) have summarized the various causality relationships into three different effects: what they
call the Multiplier, the Competition and the Marshall effects. In this paper, we build an enlarged
analytical framework by introducing and discussing (inter)sectoral dimensions. Multiplier and
Competition effects are first reassessed according to the degree of sectoral disaggregation. The
presentation of a formal monopolistic model (Matsuyama, 1995) that emphasizes the incidence
of product variety and elasticities of substitution on relative profits introduces however new
analytical results and questions. In particular, the model puts forward potential cross-sectoral
effects in terms of entries and exits that correspond to equilibrating processes given profits
inequalities, as well as Multiplier effects between products or activities that are close substitutes
or Hicks & Allen’s complementarity notion (1934) between economic activities. An
econometric model that allows for sectoral but also spatial interactions is then specified.
Econometric results obtained for Belgium confirm in particular the relevance of an
(inter)sectoral setting for research in the interrelationship between firm births and deaths.
Keywords:  Firm demography; Competition; Multiplier; Sector; Space
JEL classification:  L00; L13; L811
Introduction
A large economic literature is concerned by firm births and deaths. A variety of
contributions can be articulated around three main research orientations. A first axis is
related with industrial economics. It analyses firm demography
1 and focuses on an
explanation of the interrelationship between creations and disappearances that rests on
the distinction of Multiplier, Competition and Marshall effects (see Johnson & Parker,
1994; Carree, 1997). A second axis, which can be associated with regional economics,
is more particularly interested in spatial variations of firm births and deaths rates. These
variations are put into relations with territorial organization and resources.
Contributions integrate successfully in explanatory econometric models proxies of
territories structural and socio-economic characteristics (i.e. a measurement of
population or firm densities, human capital indices) (see Reynolds, Storey & Westhead,
1994; Dejardin, 1996, 1999; Spilling, 1996; Kangasharju, 2000). Finally, a third axis
can be defined. It takes into account spatial interactions between entrepreneurial
phenomena. Applied research appears however embryonic. We found different
approaches by simulation (van Wissen, 2000; Brenner, 2001) as well as an empirical
research introducing a spatial dimension into its modeling (Florax & Schutjens, 1996). 
The present paper could be located at the intersection between the above first and third
research axes. Its originality consists in fully integrating sectoral dimension and
aggregation into the theoretical discussion of the Multiplier and Competition effects.
Thus, after having introduced, on the one hand, the incidence of sectoral
(dis)aggregation and, on the other hand, the substitute or complementary quality of
products and economic activities that take part in the industrial sector (or in the sectoral
sector aggregate), we will be brought to suggest, first, a weighted expression of the
Multiplier and Competition effects. Weights will depend closely on the differentiation
degree between activities. An outcome will be to propose that the Competition
(Multiplier) effect will overcome more probably the Multiplier (Competition) effect
since estimations are based on very disaggregated (aggregated) data. 
But the discussion could not stop there since variety and substitutability between
activities or locations are introduced in a more formal model. That is what we will see
through a basic monopolistic competition model due to Matsuyama (1995). Here,
relative profits between different groups of industries or locations will depend crucially
on product variety and elasticities of substitution. We will be able to explain
circumstantially multiplier effects even when activities are very similar or substitutes
but also entries and exits under exogenous shocks.
An econometric study is undertaken in order to confront theoretical relations and facts
and, eventually, validate modeled relations. As the analysis is interested in located
entrepreneurial phenomena, an econometric model cannot ignore the allotopy principle
or, in other words, potential spatial interactions. The model has been therefore
spatialized. The relative distance between entries and exits potentially determines the
intensity of spatial interactions, whatever they may be. The study exploits data that refer
to Belgian administrative local level (the “commune”). 
                                                          
1 We will use indifferently the terms “demography of firms” or “firm births and deaths” in the following
text. Firm demography is however a concept that generally covers a broader reality. Additions are firm
growth and firm relocation (migration) (van Dijk & Pellenbarg, 2000; van Wissen, 2000).2
The paper is organized as follows. In the following section (section 1), interactions
between firm births and deaths are theoretically discussed. In a first sub-section (sub-
section 1.1), the contribution of Johnson & Parker (1994) is synthesized. We introduce
afterwards a enlarged analytical framework that takes into account sectoral dimensions.
This extension is the subject of the second sub-section (sub-section 1.2). The formal
monopolistic competition model is presented in sub-section 1.3. The empirical study is
exposed in the second section (section 2). We bring the data (sub-section 2.1), the
specification of the econometric model that is tested (sub-section 2.2), and the results of
estimate (sub-section 2.3). The third and last section is devoted to our conclusions
(section 3).
1. Theoretical discussion
This section presents a synthesis of the contribution of Johnson & Parker (1994) relating
to the interrelationship between firm births and deaths (sub-section 1.1). Their
contribution is enlarged by the introduction and the discussion of (inter)sectoral
dimensions of firm demography (sub-section 1.2). A model allows to discuss more
formally the outcome of product variety and substitution elasticities on relative profits
and on multiplier effects (sub-section 1.3).
1.1. Interrelationship of firm births and deaths: a temporal analysis
Johnson & Parker (1994) explore the interrelationship between firm births and deaths.
What could be the impact of new firms on the number of deaths or on the number of
births and that, from a diachronic point of view? Similarly, what occurs with firm births
and deaths after some firm deaths? The authors distinguish three different effects: what
they call the Multiplier, the Competition and the Marshall effects. 
Firm births (during one period) can have positive effects on the number of forthcoming
firm creations (or the number of firm creations during following periods), that is
Multiplier effects. These effects can be, at the origin, directly financial or they can rely
on other factors. In this last case, possible demonstration effects can be evoked: the
creation of economic activities by others would act favourably on someone’s
consideration for being entrepreneur him- or herself. With regard to financial flows, we
may indicate that new sources of income are potentially at the origin of new
expenditures, generating in their turn new activities. In an industry like retailing
2, the
creation of a commercial centre may increase the attractive power on customers from a
particular area, it may support the emergence of other trades given new profit
opportunities and it may have a positive impact on the maintenance or even the
development of existing activities. However, the new commercial centre may also
dissuade firm creations. It may also lead some companies to cease their activities given
their newly observed non-profitability that would result from an increased supply and a
decreased market share, or from the innovation the entering firm introduces on the
market and which is capturing customers from the incumbents (Competition effects). 
                                                          
2 Examples that refer to the retailing industry comes from Johnson & Parker (1994, pp. 283-284). Their
empirical applications are incidentally about this sector. We may notice that these authors have applied
elsewhere their analytical framework to what seems to be an “all sectors” aggregate (see Johnson &
Parker, 1996).3
Firm deaths (during one period) can explain the number of subsequent firm deaths (or
the number of firm deaths during following periods). We may think about a financial
crisis affecting a major company and its diffusion into a particular industry or across
industries. It means Multiplier effects once again. But firm deaths may also relax
competition and give rise to new profit opportunities and new business creations. The
authors, with reference to Storey & Jones (1987), argue also that firm deaths could
mean the sale of equipment goods at low prices. This would have a positive effect on
firm creations by lowering the installation costs.
Impacts of firm deaths on subsequent creations can also be discussed relatively to what
they imply in terms of job losses. Unemployment (or its threat) would represent an
incentive for an individual to create his or her own enterprise. However, at the aggregate
level, high underemployment rates may result from many reasons: an economic
recession but, moreover, specific structural, institutional and political factors that would
affect negatively the development of economic activities. In this case, profit and
creation opportunities may be limited. Entrepreneurship and its attractiveness on
individuals proceed from a general context (Johnson, 1986; Storey, 1994; Dejardin,
2000). 
The effects known as Marshall effects
3 refer to what could be interpreted, at a more
disaggregated level, as the firm life cycle: a birth is followed by a death, some years
later. Consequently, the number of new firms during a given period will determine the
subsequent number of deaths. 
Johnson & Parker (1994) have proposed the following table (Table I) to synthesise the
Multiplier, the Competition and the Marshall effects which they identify in the
interrelationship between firm births and deaths. 
Table I. The Multiplier, the Competition and the Marshall effects
Expected sign of each effect
Multiplier Competition Marshall
Bt/Bt-1 + - n.a.
Dt/Dt-1 + - n.a.
Bt/Dt-1 - + n.a.
Dt/Bt-1 - + +
B, birth; D, death; n.a., not applicable.
Source: Johnson and Parker (1994).
A quick look at the table leads to notice that Multiplier and Competition effects are
relating to the same explanatory variable (firm births or deaths) and have contradictory
signs. Thus, as Johnson & Parker emphasise it, an econometric estimate of the
interrelationship between births and deaths will be able to report only net effects.
                                                          
3  “Even for those firms which are successful, death is ultimately inevitable, barring take-over. As
Marshall points out in his graphic ‘trees of the forest’ analogy, ‘sooner or later age tells on them all.’ ”
(Johnson & Parker, 1994, p. 284, with reference to Marshall, 1920, p. 263).4
The authors insist on the temporal dimension within their analysis. The effects of firm
creations and firm deaths are subject to a lags structure. This lags structure is however a
priori undefined and is to be estimated through empirical investigations. 
The contribution of Johnson & Parker is almost silent about spatial and (inter)sectoral
dimensions relating to firm demography
4. We try to go beyond these limits in the
following sub-sections. Spatial interactions will be taken into account in the
econometric model specification (see section 2.2). The (inter)sectoral dimension of firm
demography is more particularly discussed. So are the Multiplier and the Competition
effects put into relation with the level of sectoral disaggregation and with the substitute
or complementary attributes of economic activities.
1.2. Interrelationship of firm births and deaths: (inter)sectoral dimensions
This sub-section proposes an enlarged analysis of the interactions between firm births
and deaths. The (inter)sectoral dimension is introduced within the Johnson & Parker’s
framework.
The Multiplier and the Competition effects have already been defined but without any
explicit attention to industries that are entering into relationships. Since economic
activities are distinguished according to their production and are part of differentiated
industrial branches or sectors, the Multiplier and the Competition effects can receive a
priori different weights that are function of the sectoral disaggregation level. Sectoral
disaggregation and consequently homogenisation of activities within each sector that is
distinguished would reinforce the Competition effect to the detriment of the Multiplier
effect. 
The above argument is synthesised in the following expression: 
NE =  ME + (1-) CE
-  where the Net effects (NE) of Multiplier (ME) and Competition
(CE) effects with contradictory signs are the results of a weighted
sum;
-  where the value of , between 0 and 1, is a negative function of
the level of sectoral disaggregation. 
The discussion of the (inter)sectoral dimension of firm demography can still be enriched
since elasticities of substitution between activities or locations are introduced in a more
formal model. That is the subject of the following section.
                                                          
4  The (inter)sectoral dimension gives rise to a brief illustrated comment that mentions its potential
influence on firm births and deaths interrelationship. It is not formally discussed. The spatial treatment of
firm demography by these authors confines itself to exploit data attached to administrative entities (the
English Counties) of relatively small size. Smallness should give some guarantees about interactions
between firm births and deaths to exist. However, there is no reference about distance and weights within
interactions. 5
1.3. Formal Modeling
In this section, a basic model is proposed that emphasizes the distinction between
competition and multiplier effects across industries according to product differentiation.
The formalization is developed by Matsuyama (1995, pp. 713-715). The foundations go
back to the monopolistic competition model that was proposed by Dixit and Stiglitz (1977).
There are a lot of differentiated consumption goods in the economy. Suppose they are
divided into two groups, 1 and 2. The number of differentiated goods in group i is
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where   represents the elasticity of substitution between two composite indices X i.
Composite indices are defined as: 
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where variables x(zi) are quantities of consumption goods appearing in group i and 
denotes elasticity of substitution between consumption goods.
There are two types of labor in the economy, managers and workers, which supplies are
given and respectively denoted M and L. As we turn towards production, we assume for
further simplifications that producing quantity x requires x(-1)/ of workers and F
managers. Thus, (-1)/ is a constant marginal cost. The quantity of managers needed
appears as a fixed cost since it does not depend on x.
By assumption, there is no unemployment (market clearing conditions are met) for
workers as well as managers. It follows that the total number of firms is constant and
equal to M/F=n1+n2.
Profit maximization implies that marginal revenue of the firm equals marginal cost. But
we know that marginal revenue may be expressed in terms of the price p of good x and
the price demand elasticity. In Dixit and Stiglitz model (1977), as each firm neglects the
effects of its pricing policy on other firms prices, the perceived elasticity of demand is
equal to . Thus, assuming moreover that the worker receives a normalized wage w
equals to 1, the price set by each firm is:
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It follows that firms are producing at the same scale, that is x(zi)=xi; and Xi can now be
expressed as:6
i i i x n X 1   
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A Dixit and Stiglitz price index Pi=ni
1/(1-) may be derived for each group i. It measures
the minimum cost for a unit of composite Xi. By homotheticity of V, the relative demand

















It follows that relative gross profits, 1/2, can be expressed as a function of the product

































































































This is the crucial relation for our discussion. As we can see, its issue depends tightly on
the value attached to   and  . Suppose the intragroup elasticity is greater than the
intergroup one  ( > ). Then, profits are negatively related to variety. Matsuyama
(1995, p.714) gives also the following illustration: “suppose that group 1 consists of
restaurants and group 2 retail stores. A pair of restaurants or a pair of stores are much
closer substitutes than dining and shopping (…). If there are too many restaurants and a
few stores in the city, restaurants will close down and new stores will open in the long
run”. Notice that, if profits between groups are not equal (given some exogenous shock,
for example), equalization process will take place through entries and exits of firms. We
get here some arguments of cross-sectoral effects of firm entries and exits. That is not
all.
Suppose two different locations. Now, we group activities according to them. A given
(non informed) consumer could be a priori indifferent between locations ( < ). In that
case, profits are positively related to variety in location. “Entry of a new firm, by
attracting more customers, would benefit existing firms in the same street. This
introduces complementarity in the locational decision, and entry and exit processes lead
to all stores clustering into a single location” (Matsuyama, 1995, p.714). What is
important is the comparison between elasticities. Even in case of very similar products,
such processes may occur. They may be interpreted as Multiplier effects (entries are7
followed by entries). The result may also be referred to the Hicks & Allen’s notion of
complementary goods (1934) with an emphasised reference to economic activities.
Hicks & Allen have advanced the idea according to which the complementarity between
goods should be assessed according to market demand and its properties with respect to
price variations. For producers of similar goods that are localised in a particular
commercial area, the price reduction decided by one of them should imply an increase
of his or her market share and, ceteris paribus, a decrease of the market share of other
producers. Hicks & Allen’s complementarity between products can however be
suspected since the demand for each producer increases rather than decreases. The
intuition behind Hicks & Allen’s complementarity is that, although Competition effects
mean sales reductions for producers keeping an unchanged price, the price decrease
decided by one of them may also attract new customers in the specific commercial area.
The increased demand that follows may well overcompensate, for all producers, the
business-stealing effect that results from the initial price reduction. (Matsuyama, 1995)
Relating to the (inter)sectoral study of firm demography, Hicks & Allen’s
complementarity leads us to reconsider the attractive power of a particular area, with
potential cumulative effects from the supply side (goods and services that are proposed)
and the demand side (market size).
Moreover, Hicks & Allen’s complementarity is not without bringing some difficulties
into empirical studies since such complementary activities are likely to appear in sectors
where they will commonly be recognised as substitutes. In other words, Hicks &
Allen’s complementarity may explain Net Multiplier effects in econometric estimates
where, given sectoral disaggregation, Net Competition effects would have been
reasonably expected.
Given the above theoretical discussion, we could propose that the Competition
(Multiplier) effects will overcome more probably the Multiplier (Competition) effects
since estimations are based on very disaggregated (aggregated) data. The argument does
not take into account formal results about the effects of product variety and substitution
elasticities between products on firm entries and exits. According to the proposed
formal model, complementarities may occur even between very similar products. With
sub-section 1.3, there are now some reasons to anticipate cross-sectoral effects in terms
of entries (exits) followed by exits (entries) but also more frequent Multiplier effects
than it could be expected at the end of the sole sub-sections 1.1 and 1.2. What are the
facts ? That is what the following section 3 proposes to assess.
2. Estimation results
This third section presents the results of an empirical study that may be regarded as first
validation tests for the above analytical framework. The study refers to Belgium. The
section includes successively: the definition of the data, the specification and the
discussion of the econometric model and the presentation of the results.8
2.1. Data
To assess quantitatively the firm demography is not easy matter to achieve in Belgium,
given statistical availability. Nevertheless, if data sets exist
5, each of them presents
some gaps, in terms of continuity and homogeneity of definition, level of geographical
and sectoral disaggregation and access (including financial access). 
The data used for this empirical study are produced by the Belgian National Institute of
Statistics (NIS). They are extracted from the books of the Value-Added Tax authorities.
The data include the stock of active taxable self-employed agents or firms at the
beginning of each year, the registrations and deletions from the books that occurred
during a given year. Our database runs from 1996 to 2000. 
An advantage of the provided information is undoubtedly the advanced degree of detail
for which it is available. It enables indeed to distinguish 222 sectors for each of the 589
administrative local entities (“communes”) in Belgium. A handicap is its heterogeneity
as for, on the one hand, the type of agent (individuals or companies
6) and, on the other
hand, the criterion of geographical localization (abode place or working place for
individuals; registered office place or, exceptionally, place at which the VAT is declared
for companies
7). There is a source of errors in measurement that is all the more
prejudicial as the geographical unit is of reduced size. Let us note however that it is
probable that the abode or the registered office place coincide to a large extent with the
working or plant location as regards firm births. This unfortunately could not be
checked. 
Only part of the whole information was exploited as the study relates exclusively to a
selection of retail trades. Thus only 6 sectors were the subject of an econometric
research. Sectors were chosen according to nomenclature description. Our special care
was to select sectors that are a priori bringing together similar economic activities, as
the intra-sectoral homogeneity and the inter-sectoral heterogeneity are crucial for the
following empirical test. Another concern was to keep sectors that may be qualified as
“common”, that means their activity should not rely tightly on special circumstances
(idiosyncratic factors). Hotels are probably a good example as we may expect they are
mostly located close to tourist places or in major cities. In practice, we chose sectors for
which some demographic activity (at least one firm birth or firm death) was registered
in a majority of communes.
The six selected sectors are: trade of motor vehicles (NACE 501), repair of motor
vehicles (NACE 502), unspecialized retailing trade (NACE 521)
8, specialized food
retailing (NACE 522)
9, restaurants (NACE 553) and bars and coffee-houses (NACE
554).
                                                          
5 The main providers are the National Institute of Statistics, the VAT Administration, the National Office
for Social Security, the National Institute for Social Security for Self-employed people, the Commercial
Registers, and private companies as Euro-DB and Gerling Belgium.
6 There were 689 453 active taxable agents in Belgium in 2000, whom 395 908 were individuals (source:
NIS, General Statistics, 2001).
7 Source: interview at the NIS.
8 This sector may appear heterogeneous as “unspecialized retailing trade” refer to shops selling a large
brand of different products. For a large part, however, shops themselves would be substitutes. 
9 This sector is probably the most heterogeneous among the selected sectors. If they represents very
common shops, they refer to very different ones as baker’s, butcher’s, fish-shops,…9
Before ending this sub-section on the data, let us notice the fact that the statistical series
were submitted to a partial rupture in 1998. The NIS had indeed to proceed at that time
with the sectoral reclassification of a limited number of activities by using informations
resulting from an inquiry among some companies. Some firm stocks, and perhaps some
deaths, had to be affected. Notice however that the measures of stocks we used relate to
1996. 
2.2. Econometric model
The model is extensively described by the following equations and definitions: 
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-  NBi,00 and NDi,00 represent respectively the absolute number of
firm births and the absolute number of firm deaths during year
2000,
-  NBi,t and NDi,t represent respectively the absolute number of firm
births and the absolute number of firm deaths during a year t, and
Sti,96 is the stock of active firms at the end of year 1996, relating
to the administrative entity i; 
-  t represents the year: 1997, 1998 or 1999; 10
-  dij is a truncated measure of the Euclidean distance (in meters)
separating centroïds of administrative entity i and j
10; the value of
dij is zero when i equals j or when the distance between centroïds
is more than 10000 meters;
-  RBc,  RDc,  RBPc,  RDPc are defined as the respective
complements of RB, RD, RBP, RDP with respect to the aggregate
K, that is the whole of sectors k. When RB, for example, refers to
the rate of firm births in sector k, RBc is equal to the rate of firm
births in all other sectors except k.
-  the sectoral dimension is introduced by separated estimations of
the defined model, for each sector k being individually examined.
In addition, estimation for the aggregate K is considered. In that
case, RBc, RDc, RBPc, RDPc are taken out of the above specified
model.
Taking into account the spatial dimension appears all the more desirable as the
geographical unit to which are related firm demographies (or the distance that separates
them from each other) is small. Data that are collected at a very disaggregated
geographical level such as the Belgian communes invite to spatialize econometrics.
Retailing is however an industry that appears rather local. For that, the truncated
distance measure makes it possible to introduce a non-linear differentiation of potential
spatial interactions with regard to firm demographies. The function overweighs the
effects of firm births and deaths relating to very close local entities. 
Notice that the estimated equations are consistent with general guiding principles
entering the specification of a spatial econometric model, namely: spatial
interdependence, spatial asymmetry, allotopy, ex ante/ex post distinction and geography
(Klaassen & Paelinck, 1979; Jayet, 1993, pp. 70-71). 
Spatial interdependence appears through a distances matrix (geography principle)
between Belgian local entities
11. Spatial asymmetry is translated by weights into the
matrix (in fact by the number of births and deaths, according to the above specification).
Allotopy or, in other words, the fact that a localized phenomenon can be under the
influence of external factors, is described in the deterministic part of the model
(autoregressive
12 model). The introduction of time lags into the explanatory part (ex
ante/ex post distinction) offers the advantage of logical distinction between causes and
effects (the past can explain the present, the reverse is not true); it facilitates greatly
econometrics.
For some sectors, the dependent variable frequently equals zero. The truncated
distribution of the variable is explained by a significant level of sectoral and
                                                          
10  The exhaustive matrix of distances is taken from “Distances euclidiennes calculées sur base des
coordonnées des centroïdes des communes (en projection Lambert belge)”, G. Caruso, Dpt de
Géographie, UCL, 2000, electronic file.
11 Notice that we were not able to integrate spatial interactions between Belgian and foreign frontiers
entities. That is undoubtedly a limitation of the present research.
12 Corrections for heteroscedasticity using Huber-White-sandwich robust estimators should prevent the
specification of possible rival models (autoregressive models with spatial structure within residuals
covariance, for example).11
geographical disaggregation
13. It invites the use of a Tobit model (Greene, 1997; Long,
1997) and maximum likelihood estimations. Data suggests alternatively the use of a
Negative Binomial regression model where the dependant variable is a nonnegative
count variable. This is the approach we consider here
14.
A Negative Binomial model is very similar to Poisson. The difference consists in
overdispersion of the events (of the number of counts) (Long, 1997). We use the
“gnbreg” command of the econometric Intercooled STATA 6.0 software package. 
The stock of firms Sti,96 has been chosen as the exposure variable. A specific parameter
(ln ) takes into account the extra-Poisson variation. For most of the regressions,  the
parameter has moreover been modeled as a linear function of the stock of firms Sti,96.
The denoted exceptions are explained by casual difficulties to get satisfying maximum




Table II presents the estimation results obtained for firm births (NB00) and deaths
(ND00) equations relating to each sector k and to their aggregate K.
[Insert Table II]
Results give rise, first, to general comments about the global specification of the
estimated model (see the two last columns of the table). It appears that the specified
model is able to pass the Wald tests at 5% level in all cases, and at 1% level in all cases
except one (that is the birth regression relating to the repair of motor vehicles industry).
In other words, the model appears to have globally a significant explanatory power of
the current number of firm births or of firm deaths whatever the selected sector may be.
This is true also with regard to the aggregate K. 
A more detailed examination is interested in the effects (signs) attached to the different
variables that enter the model. We will first consider regressions explaining firm births
(NB00).
For all regressions are found significant positive effects from past firm births (RB9799).
That corresponds according to theory to Net Multiplier effects. These effects are
combined with significant Net Competition effects from past firm deaths (RD9799) with
regard to bars and coffee-houses and the aggregate K. 
Other interesting results relate to:
-  the specialized food retailing industry, where significant positive effects from past
deaths in other sectors (RD9799c) can be noticed. It can be interpreted as local
                                                          
13 Moreover, sectoral and spatial disaggregation gives rise to indeterminacy problems in births and deaths
rates computation (zero values divided by positive or zero values). Our answer was to give the
determinant a value equal to 1 when the ratio was 1 (or a higher value) divided by zero, and a value equal
to zero for each ratio corresponding to zero divided by zero.
14 See Dejardin (2001) for Tobit.
15 Tables in appendix.12
specialization process or, referring to the model of section 1.3, as business allocation
reshape according to relative profits;
-  restaurants, with Net Multiplier effects (or complementary effects) from past
births in other sectors (RB9799c).
Notice also significant effects in the trade of motor vehicles from spatially close births
and deaths in other sectors (RBPc and RDPc).
With regard to firm deaths (RD00), overall significant positive effects are estimated
from past firm births (RB9799). That can be interpreted as Net Competition effects but
also as Marshall effects. This last effect can certainly not be neglected in retailing
industry.
A major result consists in significant positive effects from past firm deaths (RD9799) in
the aggregate while they are revealed in only one specific sector, the repair of motor
vehicles, and even with significant negative signs (Net Competition effects) in the
specialized food retailing. An interpretation can be as follows: there would be “spill-
over effects” between sectors, creating a “depressionary movement” or a “reversed
multiplier” (a “reversed cumulative process”), firm deaths involving new ones and
affecting the whole portfolio of economic activities.
The same interpretation can be used with regard to significant positive effects from past
deaths in other sectors (RD9799c) in the trade of motor vehicles, the repair of motor
vehicles industry, the specialized food retailing, bars and coffee-houses.
We found relatively little evidence of significant spatial interactions. 
Results are supported by joined tests.
[Insert table VII]
In order to assess the generality of the above outcomes with regard to the whole of
Belgian local entities, we have divided the observations into four subgroups.  Criteria
that have been used are the median population density (number of habitants per square
kilometer the first of January 1997) and the median population growth rate (as
computed between the first of January 1997 and the 31st of December 1999)
16. They are
some arguments to distinguish located firm demographies according to proxies for
demand shocks and market size (see Carree, 1997; Carree & Thurik, 1999).
Results for the four subgroups of local entities are presented in tables III to VI.
Corresponding joined tests are in tables VIII to XI.
[Insert tables III to VI]
[Insert tables VIII to XI]
Some features can be emphasized from a broad lecture:
-  the model keeps a significant explanatory power in a vast majority of regressions.
There are however some noteworthy bad results that concern more particularly the
                                                          
16 Sources : National Institute of Statistics.13
two subgroups of local entities with (1) low population density and high population
growth and (2) low population density and low population growth;
-  with regard to firm births (NB00), significant positive effects from past firm births
(RB9799) remain, for all subgroups, in the aggregate K, and in most sectors for
entities with high population density and low population growth. A detailed study
could confirm that this subgroup includes a majority of old urbanized entities in
Belgium. The result could therefore reveal a trend for concentration of retailing
firms in cities. This is consistent with agglomeration economies arguments
17. Net
Competition effects from past firm deaths (RD9799) disappear with regard to bars
and coffee-houses in two subgroups (subgroups with low population growth). They
remain for all aggregates except one (subgroup with low population density and low
population growth);
-  with regard to firm deaths (ND00), significant positive effects from past firm births
(RB9799) remain in a majority of regressions, supporting the argument of Net
Competition effects or Marshall effects;
-  a “reversed multiplier”, firm deaths involving new ones, is still found in the
aggregate K for two subgroups (with low population density and high population
growth and high population density and low population growth). Given the
characteristics of the subgroups and the above results with regard to firm births
(NB00), this suggests complex adjustment processes and contributes to fix the limits
of the present study.
 
3. Conclusions
Firm demography has already received numerous analytical and empirical treatments
from different approaches in economics. The present paper has been located at the
intersection of two axes that were respectively associated with industrial economics and
general economic inquiry that allows for potential spatial interactions between
economic phenomena.
In a first theoretical part, the contribution has extended an analytical framework for firm
demography due to Johnson & Parker (1994). These authors have proposed to
summarize the interactions of firm births and firm deaths in terms of Multiplier,
Competition and Marshall effects. Extension have consisted in fully integrating the
(inter)sectoral dimension. The discussion of sectoral aggregation-disaggregation leads
to the proposal of Net effects resulting from weighted Multiplier and Competition
effects. Sectoral disaggregration and consequently homogenisation of activities within
each sector would reinforce the Competition effect to the detriment of the Multiplier
effect. The presentation of a formal monopolistic model that emphasizes the incidence
of product variety and elasticities of substitution on relative profits introduces however
new analytical results and questions. In particular, the model puts forward potential
cross-sectoral effects in terms of entries and exits that correspond to equilibrating
processes given profits inequalities, as well as Multiplier effects between products or
activities that are close substitutes. The distinction of complementary activities à la
Hicks & Allen (1934) introduces new questions that are more particularly addressed to
empirical research. The multiplier effect may be important even within very specialised
sectors.
                                                          
17 See Ottaviano & Puga (1998).14
The extended analytical framework has been submitted afterwards to empirical
confrontations that relate to Belgium. The exercise consisted in estimating a spatialised
econometric model for 6 commercial sectors and their aggregate. The model integrates
past entries and exits and allows for spatial and cross-sectoral interactions.
Results reveal a globally significant explanatory power of the model for firm births and
deaths. These results appear globally robust with regard to subgroups of observations.
They give some support to the analytical framework. In particular, referring to the
incidence of the disaggregation degree on the intensity of both Multiplier and
Competition effects, estimates distinguish significant Net Multiplier effects on firm
deaths emerging from past firm deaths in the aggregate and in only one specific sector.
That has been interpreted as a “reversed multiplier” or a “reversed cumulative process”.
Although it requires undoubtedly additional analyses and empirical studies, our research
has particularly demonstrated the relevance of an (inter)sectoral setting in the study of
firm demography.
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Table II. Estimation results (all observations, n=589)
Sector i Dep. Var. Const. RB9799 RD9799 RB9799c RD9799c RBP9799 RDP9799 RBP9799c RDP9799c Wald 
2(8) Signif.
Trade of motor vehicles NB00 -3.0984 .6031 -.0140 -.4772 -.0376 749.06 -473.331 -2732.69 -2138.03 20.89 0.0074
(NACE 501) (.2189) (.2776) (.4303) (.8224) (.7494) (677.66) (520.21) (1142.51) (890.28)
[0.000] [0.030] [0.974] [0.562] [0.960] [0.269] [0.363] [0.017] [0.016]
*** ** ** **
ND00 -3.6200 .5516 .4523 .4885 1.3634 402.13 -126.22 -514.78 275.88 154.06 0.0000
(.1939) (.2171) (.3804) (.6516) (.5611) (536.17) (398.95) (1041.59) (831.73)
[0.000] [0.011] [0.234] [0.453] [0.015] [0.453] [0.752] [0.621] [0.740]
*** ** **
Repair of motor vehicles NB00 -3.2158 .7156 .2055 .2111 .2752 423.55 -107.30 -1146.69 738.62 19.81 0.0111
(NACE 502) (.2267) (.3459) (.4199) (.7841) (.8094) (501.13) (384.90) (1431.70) (1118.39)
[0.000] [0.039] [0.624] [0.788] [0.734] [0.398] [0.780] [0.423] [0.509]
*** **
ND00 -3.8382 .7654 .8177 1.1880 1.4395 360.28 -325.46 -1140.05 921.50 55.70 0.0000
(.1945) (.2830) (.3027) (.7281) (.6438) (478.23) (369.54) (981.53) (759.27)
[0.000] [0.007] [0.007] [0.103] [0.025] [0.451] [0.378] [0.245] [0.225]
*** *** *** **
Unspecial. retailing trade NB00 -4.4849 1.6429 .1985 -.6625 4.2500 437.12 -365.18 822.95 -719.43 80.56 0.0000
(NACE 521) (.2464) (.5097) (.4353) (.8944) (.7754) (385.69) (324.01) (1537.03) (1245.23)
[0.000] [0.001] [0.648] [0.459] [0.000] [0.257] [0.260] [0.592] [0.563]
*** ***
ND00 -2.5936 1.3280 -.3076 -1.1566 0.7772 20.72 -24.74 -348.12 308.32 195.28 0.0000
(.2002) (.1379) (.2998) (.6203) (.5591) (312.43) (266.61) (799.15) (663.94)
[0.000] [0.000] [0.305] [0.062] [0.164] [0.947] [0.926] [0.663] [0.642]
*** *** * *
Spec. food retailing NB00 -3.4951 .8370 .1522 .1031 1.1854 556.48 -141.97 222.13 -307.68 32.29 0.0001
(NACE 522) (.1627) (.3105) (.3593) (.5445) (.4982) (615.36) (473.27) (702.65) (570.13)
[0.000] [0.007] [0.672] [0.850] [0.017] [0.366] [0.764] [0.752] [0.589]
*** *** **
ND00 -2.8656 1.4826 -.8614 .2755 .8824 312.25 -60.97 780.20 -736.63 89.69 0.0000
(.1386) (.1835) (.2491) (.4501) (.4134) (413.42) (353.21) (613.78) (515.19)
[0.000] [0.000] [0.001] [0.540] [0.033] [0.475] [0.863] [0.204] [0.153]
*** *** *** **
( ) : Standard deviation ; [ ] : Prob-value ; * : p. v.  10% ; ** : p. v.  5% ; *** : p. v.  1%; ° : ln  not modeled.18
Table II (cont.). Estimation results (all observations, n=589)
Restaurants NB00 -2.7248 .8535 .1532 .6927 .2806 134.61 -98.46 -98.95 11.30 86.62 0.0000
(NACE 553) (.1041) (.1317) (.1665) (.4056) (.3603) (194.34) (188.45) (1121.0) (803.64)
[0.000] [0.000] [0.358] [0.088] [0.436] [0.489] [0.601] [0.930] [0.989]
*** *** *
ND00 -3.0027 1.1072 .2138 .4577 .6379 128.76 -100.01 -521.67 345.03 114.84 0.0000
(.1111) (.1573) (.1765) (.4659) (.3946) (206.99) (199.25) (928.39) (663.94)
[0.000] [0.000] [0.226] [0.326] [0.106] [0.534] [0.616] [0.574] [0.603]
*** ***
Bars & coffee-houses NB00 -3.1384 .9452 .5405 .1164 .0149 132.16 -16.20 -700.66 433.44 40.74 0.0000
(NACE 554) (.1213) (.2498) (.2517) (.4272) (.3932) (332.42) (208.08) (669.95) (570.97)
[0.000] [0.000] [0.032] [0.785] [0.970] [0.691] [0.938] [0.296] [0.448]
*** *** **
ND00 -2.9264 1.1700 .0192 .1650 1.1380 194.19 -34.26 39.57 -174.99 76.22 0.0000
(.1065) (.1918) (.1895) (.3319) (.3688) (200.74) (128.76) (551.58) (469.45)




Total NB00 ° -3.2767 1.3904 .9716 -233.53 177.85 148.09 0.0000
(NACE 501, 502, 521, 522,  .0585 (.2287) (.2021) (427.89) (343.83)
553, 554) [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.585] [0.605]
*** *** ***
ND00 -3.0563 1.6165 .7840 109.32 -76.856 139.38 0.0000
(.0597) (.2215) (.1935) (348.52) (277.58)
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.754] [0.782]
*** *** ***
( ) : Standard deviation ; [ ] : Prob-value ; * : p. v.  10% ; ** : p. v.  5% ; *** : p. v.  1%; ° : ln  not modeled.19
Table III. Estimation results (median high pop. density and high pop. growth, n=115)
Sector i Dep. Var. Const. RB9799 RD9799 RB9799c RD9799c RBP9799 RDP9799 RBP9799c RDP9799c Wald 
2(8) Signif.
Trade of motor vehicles NB00 -3.3625 .5964 .2977 -.4041 .5213 448.72 -622.31 -1687.46 1548.61 140.09 0.0000
(NACE 501) (.3176) (.8241) (.7772) (1.3744) (1.1457) (1171.80) (1055.12) (1697.60) (1272.44)
[0.000] [0.469] [0.702] [0.769] [0.649] [0.702] [0.555] [0.320] [0.224]
***
ND00 -3.2807 1.0140 1.8998 -1.9027 1.3659 -1098.93 1086.47 -2666.90 1909.27 12.59 0.1267
(.3750) (1.0176) (.8794) (1.4172) (1.1570) (1239.21) (1049.82) (1866.78) (1467.96)
[0.000] [0.319] [0.031] [0.179] [0.238] [0.375] [0.301] [0.153] [0.193]
*** ** **
Repair of motor vehicles NB00 -4.078 -.0164 1.0951 .8992 1.9229 669.09 -415.33 4307.66 -3551.76 10.13 0.2560
(NACE 502) (.5684) (1.039) (.7998) (1.6336) (1.5898) (1308.48) (804.86) (3040.08) (2354.74)
[0.000] [0.987] [0.171] [0.582] [0.226] [0.609] [0.606] [0.156] [0.131]
***
ND00 -3.7858 2.0098 .5297 -.0305 2.2058 485.18 -248.88 -2154.582 1662.70 66.05 0.0000
(.4058) (.6448) (.2810) (1.5092) (1.0099) (663.76) (499.94) (1622.05) (1261.44)
[0.000] [0.002] [0.059] [0.984] [0.029] [0.465] [0.619] [0.184] [0.187]
*** *** ** **
Unspecial. retailing trade NB00 -4.2717 3.3557 -1.5115 -3.5538 5.9216 867.67 -439.50 7559.21 -6400.55 43.96 0.0000
(NACE 521) (.5781) (.8747) (.9569) (2.001) (1.9218) (792.17) (666.65) (2379.29) (1978.40)
[0.000] [0.000] [0.114] [0.076] [0.002] [0.273] [0.510] [0.001] [0.001]
*** *** * *** *** ***
ND00 -2.3044 2.9595 .2875 -2.2631 -.9897 831.87 -485.97 2059.61 -1822.56 48.96 0.0000
(.4111) (.5735) (.7698) (1.3469) (1.2098) (507.06) (431.99) (2001.49) (1629.83)
[0.000] [0.000] [0.709] [0.093] [0.413] [0.101] [0.261] [0.303] [0.263]
*** *** *
Spec. food retailing NB00 -3.0709 1.1198 .2502 -1.0337 .6864 334.36 -401.06 -2102.55 1897.40 5.14 0.7425
(NACE 522) (7.8302) (13.2902) (47.5697) (6.3230) (33.3140) (31174.92) (18212.14) (17462.71) (12744.84)
[0.695] [0.933] [0.996] [0.870] [0.984] [0.991] [0.982] [0.904] [0.882]
ND00 ° -3.0641 1.8782 -.9198 .3700 1.0753 819.48 -453.86 616.68 -546.84 24.71 0.0017
(.2249) (.5090) (.7333) (.8416) (.8532) (816.21) (717.03) (1047.81) (903.04)
[0.000] [0.000] [0.210] [0.660] [0.208] [0.315] [0.527] [0.556] [0.545]
*** ***
( ) : Standard deviation ; [ ] : Prob-value ; * : p. v.  10% ; ** : p. v.  5% ; *** : p. v.  1%; ° : ln  not modeled.20
Table III (cont.). Estimation results (median high pop. density and high pop. growth, n=115)
Restaurants NB00 -2.7491 1.1804 .2544 .1381 .1084 381.16 -350.21 834.42 -617.28 39.44 0.0000
(NACE 553) (.2256) (.3455) (.4488) (.7944) (.6883) (315.52) (334.55) (1580.87) (1177.46)
[0.000] [0.001] [0.571] [0.862] [0.875] [0.227] [0.295] [0.598] [0.600]
*** ***
ND00 -3.1046 1.1610 .6473 .5929 -.0271 77.548 131.05 695.08 -785.87 454.90 0.0000
(.2172) (.3721) (.3267) (.9868) (.8440) (459.85) (461.11) (1759.70) (1266.25)
[0.000] [0.002] [0.048] [0.548] [0.974] [0.866] [0.776] [0.693] [0.535]
*** *** **
Bars & coffee-houses NB00 ° -2.9410 .7114 1.0653 .5982 -1.5028 -539.56 439.69 -1009.00 621.47 29.96 0.0002
(NACE 554) (.2043) (.4476) (.3545) (.8398) (.9098) (547.52) (343.99) (1054.62) (930.61)
[0.000] [0.112] [0.003] [0.476] [0.099] [0.324] [0.201] [0.339] [0.504]
*** *** *
ND00 -2.8002 1.7196 .1871 -.3989 .0683 152.58 -25.51 706.71 -701.84 42.08 0.0000
(.2329) (.3851) (.3756) (.7912) (.8819) (328.78) (208.99) (947.27) (804.16)




Total NB00 -3.2145 1.0023 1.0919 -6.0743 8.0011 41.08 0.0000
(NACE 501, 502, 521, 522,  (.1120) (.3599) (.3602) (630.15) (501.94)
553, 554) [0.000] [0.005] [0.002] [0.992] [0.987]
*** *** ***
ND00 -3.0431 1.6120 .5746 730.63 -568.06 48.15 0.0000
(.1028) (.3876) (.3874) (708.51) (566.09)
[0.000] [0.000] [0.138] [0.302] [0.316]
*** ***
( ) : Standard deviation ; [ ] : Prob-value ; * : p. v.  10% ; ** : p. v.  5% ; *** : p. v.  1%; ° : ln  not modeled.21
Table IV. Estimation results (median low pop. density and high pop. growth, n=180)
Sector i Dep. Var. Const. RB9799 RD9799 RB9799c RD9799c RBP9799 RDP9799 RBP9799c RDP9799c Wald 
2(8) Signif.
Trade of motor vehicles NB00 -3.3362 -.3674 -1.5007 .0861 .8379 1744.59 -720.03 -1387.00 1159.63 34.36 0.0000
(NACE 501) (.5823) (.7544) (.8582) (1.7575) (1.5109) (636.45) (691.68) (2318.61) (1940.96)
[0.000] [0.626] [0.080] [0.961] [0.579] [0.006] [0.298] [0.550] [0.550]
*** * ***
ND00 -3.0947 .4142 -.3960 -2.9240 2.6510 432.39 -2444.48 -2714.81 2931.03 14.04 0.0808
(.5868) (.6880) (.8368) (1.8872) (1.2643) (1856.87) (1512.07) (3519.22) (2993.25)
[0.000] [0.547] [0.636] [0.121] [0.036] [0.816] [0.106] [0.440] [0.327]
*** **
Repair of motor vehicles NB00 -2.6248 1.2416 -1.0190 -.6410 .1438 -588.48 365.82 -1753.03 829.58 6.20 0.6248
(NACE 502) (.5086) (.5402) (1.2246) (1.7376) (1.3933) (1659.69) (2341.98) (3697.16) (2615.42)
[0.000] [0.022] [0.405] [0.712] [0.918] [0.723] [0.876] [0.635] [0.751]
*** **
ND00 -3.2447 .7297 .1379 2.1238 -.9223 596.56 -1624.84 -937.721 1037.21 5.09 0.7481
(.4460) (.6232) (.7264) (1.5297) (1.3175) (1338.28) (1846.34) (2374.91) (1751.69)
[0.000] [0.242] [0.849] [0.165] [0.484] [0.656] [0.379] [0.693] [0.554]
***
Unspecial. retailing trade NB00 -3.8577 .7397 -.0780 -2.6555 4.6142 -716.55 792.70 400.618 -652.99 28.28 0.0004
(NACE 521) (.5039) (.8006) (.6156) (1.5369) (1.5136) (1368.37) (796.36) (3058.52) (2570.56)
[0.000] [0.356] [0.899] [0.084] [0.002] [0.601] [0.320] [0.896] [0.799]
*** * ***
ND00 -2.4041 1.2973 -.8594 -1.9156 1.1501 148.27 382.26 -2643.36 1860.94 83.77 0.0000
(.4553) (.4921) (.5692) (1.4760) (1.1221) (744.48) (496.82) (2156.52) (1764.93)
[0.000] [0.008] [0.131] [0.194] [0.305] [0.842] [0.442] [0.220] [0.292]
*** ***
Spec. food retailing NB00 -3.6532 .3733 .7078 2.8755 -.7229 2682.42 -1525.93 -340.51 -17.16 12.62 0.1257
(NACE 522) (.4627) (.5904) (.6762) (1.3214) (1.0975) (1400.99) (1022.23) (1624.30) (1275.89)
[0.000] [0.527] [0.295] [0.030] [0.510] [0.056] [0.136] [0.834] [0.989]
*** ** *
ND00 -2.5335 1.1667 -.8948 -.5205 .5205 714.56 -141.44 17.06 -212.50 10.91 0.2066
(.3437) (.4514) (.5163) (1.0936) (.8040) (1368.78) (971.53) (1720.14) (1460.69)
[0.000] [0.010] [0.083] [0.634] [0.517] [0.602] [0.884] [0.992] [0.884]
*** *** *
( ) : Standard deviation ; [ ] : Prob-value ; * : p. v.  10% ; ** : p. v.  5% ; *** : p. v.  1%; ° : ln  not modeled.22
Table IV (cont.). Estimation results (median low pop. density and high pop. growth, n=180)
Restaurants NB00 -2.4189 .7947 .1217 -.7737 .5668 -133.60 160.92 -1114.43 434.97 13.40 0.0988
(NACE 553) (.3097) (.3105) (.3191) (.9275) (.7499) (604.23) (604.43) (2362.42) (1994.29)
[0.000] [0.010] [0.703] [0.404] [0.450] [0.825] [0.790] [0.637] [0.827]
*** ***
ND00 -3.0545 1.0149 .1439 .4398 1.3641 157.09 140.46 -1948.48 747.32 23.85 0.0024
(.3003) (.3206) (.3069) (.9846) (.8369) (517.40) (573.16) (1883.25) (1369.89)
[0.000] [0.002] [0.639] [0.655] [0.103] [0.761] [0.806] [0.301] [0.585]
*** ***
Bars & coffee-houses NB00 -3.7403 .5157 1.0330 1.0253 .9120 -1770.33 1331.42 1941.352 -1606.24 19.99 0.0104
(NACE 554) (.3158) (.4631) (.5839) (.9172) (1.0049) (939.97) (666.64) (1496.37) (1276.41)
[0.000] [0.266] [0.077] [0.264] [0.364] [0.060] [0.046] [0.195] [0.208]
*** * * **
ND00 -3.0294 .5058 .6601 1.8317 .0080 961.75 -505.38 1193.75 -1405.28 26.10 0.0010
(.2452) (.3709) (.3970) (.7036) (.7262) (775.71) (603.56) (1142.72) (1006.45)




Total NB00 -3.2356 1.0266 1.0885 -489.04 320.50 16.69 0.0022
(NACE 501, 502, 521, 522,  (.1446) (.5187) (.4407) (1187.82) (998.35)
553, 554) [0.000] [0.048] [0.014] [0.681] [0.748]
*** ** **
ND00 -3.0219 1.4067 .8513 -446.53 330.64 17.87 0.0013
(.1483) (.5060) (.3695) (828.35) (681.81)
[0.000] [0.005] [0.021] [0.590] [0.628]
*** *** **
( ) : Standard deviation ; [ ] : Prob-value ; * : p. v.  10% ; ** : p. v.  5% ; *** : p. v.  1%; ° : ln  not modeled.23
Table V. Estimation results (median high pop. density and low pop. growth, n=180)
Sector i Dep. Var. Const. RB9799 RD9799 RB9799c RD9799c RBP9799 RDP9799 RBP9799c RDP9799c Wald 
2(8) Signif.
Trade of motor vehicles NB00 -3.0925 1.8200 .4984 -.7198 -.5052 -609.57 641.74 -9047.76 6918.19 27.57 0.0006
(NACE 501) (.3539) (.8856) (.8433) (1.5508) (1.5307) (1182.59) (885.40) (2382.77) (1823.22)
[0.000] [0.040] [0.555] [0.643] [0.741] [0.606] [0.469] [0.000] [0.000]
*** ** *** ***
ND00 -3.7696 1.5354 .6249 2.0574 .0657 3.8983 146.06 2323.45 -2005.82 194.52 0.0000
(.2648) (.5591) (.5317) (.9968) (.8860) (799.75) (605.24) (1453.13) (1168.63)
[0.000] [0.006] [0.240] [0.039] [0.941] [0.996] [0.809] [0.110] [0.086]
*** *** ** *
Repair of motor vehicles NB00 -4.0959 .6223 .0832 .0238 2.8582 1560.87 -877.34 -6040.43 4540.12 25.33 0.0014
(NACE 502) (.3723) (.5954) (.8915) (1.4758) (1.5846) (1194.68) (886.07) (2391.33) (1853.52)
[0.000] [0.296] [0.926] [0.987] [0.071] [0.191] [0.322] [0.012] [0.014]
*** * ** **
ND00 ° -4.4382 1.1238 .7304 -.1273 3.9242 619.84 -676.02 -1052.28 881.86 45.78 0.0000
(.3190) (.5196) (.7574) (1.1977) (1.1034) (1019.32) (741.02) (2049.62) (1574.25)
[0.000] [0.031] [0.335] [0.915] [0.000] [0.543] [0.362] [0.608] [0.575]
*** ** ***
Unspecial. retailing trade NB00 -4.7377 2.7542 .6547 .4837 3.0767 1751.78 -1558.07 -359.38 271.57 102.59 0.0000
(NACE 521) (.3261) (.7890) (.8495) (1.3100) (1.1557) (738.06) (621.11) (2992.29) (2400.19)
[0.000] [0.000] [0.441] [0.712] [0.008] [0.018] [0.012] [0.904] [0.910]
*** *** *** ** **
ND00 -2.8215 1.0312 .1164 .2110 .3044 255.27 -198.26 120.86 -126.62 586.57 0.0000
(.3160) (.5567) (.5146) (.9576) (.9310) (408.84) (345.54) (1777.88) (1427.89)
[0.000] [0.064] [0.821] [0.826] [0.744] [0.532] [0.566] [0.946] [0.929]
*** *
Spec. food retailing NB00 -3.9092 1.2649 .5324 -.1262 1.9225 695.18 -276.93 2484.50 -2097.97 41.52 0.0000
(NACE 522) (.2205) (.5102) (.5305) (.8923) (0.8428) (1064.91) (813.27) (1175.31) (972.97)
[0.000] [0.013] [0.316] [0.888] [0.023] [0.514] [0.733] [0.035] [0.031]
*** ** ** ** **
ND00 -3.0120 1.7332 -.8040 .6069 .9730 424.91 -195.44 2024.89 -1731.91 25.76 0.0012
(.2249) (.4578) (.4305) (.7569) (.8068) (952.64) (695.46) (1156.23) (935.23)
[0.000] [0.000] [0.062] [0.423] [0.228] [0.656] [0.779] [0.080] [0.064]
*** *** * * *
( ) : Standard deviation ; [ ] : Prob-value ; * : p. v.  10% ; ** : p. v.  5% ; *** : p. v.  1%; ° : ln  not modeled.24
Table V (cont.). Estimation results (median high pop. density and low pop. growth, n=180)
Restaurants NB00 -2.6859 .9904 -.1614 1.3816 -.1286 247.43 -201.99 -64.38 -28.11 52.31 0.0000
(NACE 553) (.1548) (.2207) (.2704) (.6551) (.6218) (338.56) (317.85) (2069.87) (1468.96)
[0.000] [0.000] [0.550] [0.035] [0.836] [0.465] [0.525] [0.975] [0.985]
*** *** **
ND00 -2.8671 .9388 .4601 .4040 .2178 -137.69 97.43 189.09 -73.43 42.31 0.0000
(.1652) (.2966) (.3260) (.7186) (.6124) (307.54) (286.89) (1683.73) (1198.44)
[0.000] [0.002] [0.158] [0.574] [0.722] [0.654] [0.734] [0.911] [0.951]
*** ***
Bars & coffee-houses NB00 -3.2092 1.3857 .2717 -.8328 .9491 647.24 -361.52 -892.25 620.15 29.76 0.0002
(NACE 554) (.1900) (.4284) (.4667) (.6809) (.5481) (556.21) (374.68) (1277.92) (1065.80)
[0.000] [0.001] [0.560] [0.221] [0.083] [0.245] [0.335] [0.485] [0.561]
*** *** *
ND00 -2.9764 1.0671 .1054 -.1022 1.6432 140.33 33.50 -.9623 -195.24 51.29 0.0000
(.1410) (.3194) (.3155) (.4594) (.4724) (343.82) (233.13) (969.21) (870.35)




Total NB00 -3.4140 1.7478 1.1196 -619.98 474.68 122.47 0.0000
(NACE 501, 502, 521, 522,  (.0804) (.3577) (.3191) (746.32) (599.60)
553, 554) [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.406] [0.429]
*** *** ***
ND00 -3.1294 1.6211 1.0710 565.92 -442.94 76.45 0.0000
(.0956) (.3786) (.3405) (517.20) (411.44)
[0.000] [0.000] [0.002] [0.274] [0.282]
*** *** ***
( ) : Standard deviation ; [ ] : Prob-value ; * : p. v.  10% ; ** : p. v.  5% ; *** : p. v.  1%; ° : ln  not modeled.25
Table VI. Estimation results (median low pop. density and low pop. growth, n=114)
Sector i Dep. Var. Const. RB9799 RD9799 RB9799c RD9799c RBP9799 RDP9799 RBP9799c RDP9799c Wald 
2(8) Signif.
Trade of motor vehicles NB00 -2.1607 1.1428 .5691 -.3590 -4.4001 935.02 2655.14 6283.36 -7332.26 77.00 0.0000
(NACE 501) (.5375) (.6006) (.6371) (1.6052) (1.8506) (859.00) (723.67) (4412.72) (3615.15)
[0.000] [0.057] [0.372] [0.823] [0.017] [0.276] [0.000] [0.154] [0.043]
*** * ** *** **
ND00 -3.3175 1.0205 -.3712 .9192 -.1611 1208.25 -1199.47 -2648.39 2169.43 533.95 0.0000
(.5194) (.4057) (.6902) (1.4340) (1.6011) (777.05) (1220.70) (2842.28) (2347.05)
[0.000] [0.012] [0.591] [0.522] [0.920] [0.120] [0.326] [0.351] [0.355]
*** **
Repair of motor vehicles NB00 ° -1.7346 .7905 -.2669 .2959 -3.8247 1776.75 -1247.09 -786.80 64.11 9.61 0.2934
(NACE 502) (.5177) (.6924) (.7941) (1.9393) (1.6754) (1678.71) (1082.56) (4557.91) (3624.22)
[0.001] [0.254] [0.737] [0.879] [0.022] [0.290] [0.249] [0.863] [0.986]
*** **
ND00  -3.2924 -1.0246 .9319 1.1837 .6059 2483.17 -1169.43 -5003.80 4020.41 76.52 0.0000
(.3840) (.6843) (.6577) (1.4095) (1.4130) (1370.91) (1078.34) (2818.58) (2296.70)
[0.000] [0.134] [0.156] [0.401] [0.668] [0.070] [0.278] [0.076] [0.080]
*** * * *
Unspecial. retailing trade NB00 ° -3.0804 -1.1585 -.8786 -.3353 .8110 -3403.82 2075.05 -4938.93 4020.60 10.51 0.2309
(NACE 521) (.7429) (1.1390) (1.1480) (2.2531) (2.6902) (2218.09) (1228.37) (2724.25) (2420.22)
[0.000] [0.309] [0.444] [0.882] [0.763] [0.125] [0.091] [0.070] [0.097]
*** * * *
ND00 -2.2525 1.0519 -1.2503 -1.4104 .5411 -670.34 631.97 -613.69 274.65 444.89 0.0000
(.5045) (.1452) (.7557) (1.7722) (1.3586) (1666.11) (937.67) (3692.46) (3241.27)
[0.000] [0.000] [0.098] [0.426] [0.690] [0.687] [0.500] [0.868] [0.932]
*** *** *
Spec. food retailing NB00 -2.4328 .6964 -.8179 -3.0409 1.1975 -1953.04 1619.98 -942.16 640.14 10.91 0.2067
(NACE 522) (.6633) (.8130) (1.1277) (1.7686) (1.8800) (1549.57) (968.40) (2848.16) (2550.29)
[0.000] [0.392] [0.468] [0.086] [0.524] [0.208] [0.094] [0.741] [0.802]
*** * *
ND00 -2.3154 1.1901 -.9213 -1.1341 .1588 -993.32 1037.85 220.32 -344.80 64.38 0.0000
(.3322) (.2181) (.4822) (1.0236) (.9617) (704.86) (570.14) (1301.31) (1173.81)
[0.000] [0.000] [0.056] [0.268] [0.869] [0.159] [0.069] [0.866] [0.769]
*** *** * *
( ) : Standard deviation ; [ ] : Prob-value ; * : p. v.  10% ; ** : p. v.  5% ; *** : p. v.  1%; ° : ln  not modeled.26
Table VI (cont.). Estimation results (median low pop. density and low pop. growth, n=114)
Restaurants NB00 -2.8428 .8091 .3552 2.3836 -.7400 817.02 -65.15 -756.80 -1155.61 52.83 0.0000
(NACE 553) (.3041) (.2489) (.3495) (1.0998) (1.1459) (612.99) (718.18) (3824.23) (2844.05)
[0.000] [0.001] [0.309] [0.030] [0.518] [0.183] [0.928] [0.843] [0.685]
*** *** **
ND00 -2.5373 .9834 -.4427 -.2122 .4168 1218.71 -1160.82 -1497.77 958.98 31.72 0.0001
(.2892) (.3122) (.3541) (1.2238) (1.1994) (550.60) (571.40) (2653.53) (1967.37)
[0.000] [0.002] [0.211] [0.862] [0.728] [0.027] [0.042] [0.572] [0.626]
*** *** ** **
Bars & coffee-houses NB00 -2.8639 1.1884 -.1769 .9358 -.8821 161.77 -240.18 1137.04 -807.11 8.22 0.4124
(NACE 554) (.3868) (.6430) (.6325) (1.0133) (1.0104) (1360.72) (1002.34) (1692.85) (1249.09)
[0.000] [0.065] [0.780] [0.356] [0.383] [0.905] [0.811] [0.502] [0.518]
*** **
ND00 -2.8615 1.9722 -1.2256 -.5491 2.0778 261.58 -15.57 -1162.89 767.56 22.28 0.0044
(.2610) (.5326) (.5303) (1.0576) (.7961) (1059.25) (849.50) (1501.99) (1131.72)
[0.000] [0.000] [0.021] [0.604] [0.009] [0.805] [0.985] [0.439] [0.498]
*** *** ** ***
Wald 
2(4)
Total NB00 -2.8535 1.5642 -.7000 94.65 -97.31 4.74 0.3146
(NACE 501, 502, 521, 522,  (.1856) (.7295) (.5621) (1195.11) (970.28)
553, 554) [0.000] [0.032] [0.213] [0.937] [0.920]
*** **
ND00 -2.8164 1.4986 0.0272 -1004.14 845.31 11.74 0.0194
(.1392) (.5187) (.4582) (1026.31) (841.86)
[0.000] [0.004] [0.953] [0.328] [0.315]
*** ***
( ) : Standard deviation ; [ ] : Prob-value ; * : p. v.  10% ; ** : p. v.  5% ; *** : p. v.  1%; ° : ln  not modeled.27
Table VII. Joined tests (all observations, n=589)






























Trade of motor vehicles NB00 10.64 4.21 0.55 0.49 2.42 2.21 5.77 5.19 20.89
(NACE 501) [0.0049]*** [0.0402]** [0.7612] [0.4847] [0.2979] [0.1372] [0.0558]* [0.0228]** [0.0074]***
ND00 37.45 17.45 10.20 8.40 20.10 3.65 5.38 1.18 154.06
[0.0000]*** [0.0000]*** [0.0061]*** [0.0038]*** [0.0000]*** [0.0561]* [0.0678]* [0.2777] [0.0000]***
Repair of motor vehicles NB00  5.97 4.38 0.43 0.43 6.84 4.35 5.15 1.59 19.81
(NACE 502) [0.0506]* [0.0364]** [0.8075] [0.5134] [0.0327]** [0.0370]** [0.0763]* [0.2079] [0.0111]**
ND00  23.76 23.70 18.72 17.98 0.88 0.05 2.40 0.93 55.70
[0.0000]*** [0.0000]*** [0.0001]*** [0.0000]*** [0.6433] [0.8293] [0.3016] [0.3353] [0.0000]***
Unspecial. retailing trade NB00  12.66 10.79 38.95 21.52 1.28 0.96 1.44 0.12 80.56
(NACE 521) [0.0018]*** [0.0010]*** [0.0000]*** [0.0000]*** [0.5261] [0.3268] [0.4872] [0.7274] [0.0000]***
ND00 96.95 8.86 3.96 0.35 0.16 0.01 0.49 0.08 195.28
[0.0000]*** [0.0029]*** [0.1384] [0.5561] [0.9230] [0.9356] [0.7811] [0.7772] [0.0000]***
Spec. food retailing NB00 9.19 6.43 7.46 5.33 3.65 3.26 1.65 0.23 32.29
(NACE 522) [0.0101]** [0.0112]** [0.0239]** [0.0209]** [0.1614] [0.0709]* [0.4380] [0.6282] [0.0001]***
ND00 66.20 5.79 7.48 6.33 3.47 3.02 2.88 0.11 89.69
[0.0000]*** [0.0162]** [0.0238]** [0.0119]** [0.1763] [0.0824]* [0.2365] [0.7406] [0.0000]***
Restaurants NB00 49.06 29.89 6.61 6.54 1.41 1.24 1.89 0.07 86.62
(NACE 553) [0.0000]*** [0.0000]*** [0.0366]** [0.0105]** [0.4938] [0.2657] [0.3894] [0.7851] [0.0000]***
ND00 69.91 52.84 7.95 7.32 0.84 0.69 0.66 0.43 114.84
[0.0000]*** [0.0000]*** [0.0188]** [0.0068]*** [0.6555] [0.4045] [0.7191] [0.5131] [0.0000]***
Bars & coffee-houses NB00 33.94 32.96 0.12 0.11 2.45 0.73 3.93 3.59 40.74
(NACE 554) [0.0000]*** [0.0000]*** [0.9400] [0.7377] [0.2935] [0.3928] [0.1401] [0.0582] [0.0000]***
ND00 44.74 32.21 12.94 11.27 9.00 3.84 4.12 1.47 76.22
[0.0000]*** [0.0000]*** [0.0016]*** [0.0008]*** [0.0111]** [0.0500]** [0.1276] [0.2261] [0.0000]***
 
2(4)
Total NB00 144.97 144.42 0.93 0.43 148.09
(NACE 501, 502, 521, 522,  [0.0000]*** [0.0000]*** [0.6287] [0.5132] [0.0000]***
553, 554) ND00 136.52 136.29 0.92 0.20 139.38
[0.0000]*** [0.0000]*** [0.6300] [0.6522] [0.0000]***
[ ] : Prob-value (p.v.) of H0 ; * : p. v.  10% ; ** : p. v.  5% ; *** : p. v.  1%.28
Table VIII. Joined tests (median high pop. density and high pop. growth, n=115)






























Trade of motor vehicles NB00 0.72 0.68 0.21 0.01 0.75 0.25 5.06 0.09 140.09
(NACE 501) [0.6977] [0.4104] [0.9010] [0.9205] [0.6885] [0.6140] [0.0798]* [0.7612] [0.0000]***
ND00 5.77 4.81 2.20 0.16 1.32 0.00 3.56 3.09 12.59
[0.0558]* [0.0283]** [0.3326] [0.6916] [0.5158] [0.9700] [0.1683] [0.0786]* [0.1267]
Repair of motor vehicles NB00  2.98 0.98 2.77 2.59 0.28 0.15 3.26 1.09 10.13
(NACE 502) [0.3537] [0.3212] [0.2500] [0.1075] [0.8715] [0.6966] [0.1964] [0.2961] [0.2560]
ND00  31.01 22.96 6.61 2.83 0.66 0.59 1.77 1.59 66.05
[0.0000]*** [0.0000]*** [0.0367]** [0.0923]* [0.7178] [0.4429] [0.4137] [0.2075] [0.0000]***
Unspecial. retailing trade NB00  18.96 1.81 9.50 1.83 1.66 1.37 10.54 5.75 43.96
(NACE 521) [0.0001]*** [0.1790] [0.0086]*** [0.1759] [0.4353] [0.2424] [0.0051] [0.0165] [0.0000]***
ND00 26.78 11.47 4.97 4.84 5.15 5.02 3.07 0.37 48.96
[0.0000]*** [0.0007]*** [0.0833]* [0.0278]** [0.0761]* [0.0251]** [0.2155] [0.5428] [0.0000]***
Spec. food retailing NB00 0.95 0.00 0.49 0.00 0.19 0.00 0.72 0.00 5.14
(NACE 522) [0.6214] [0.9820] [0.7811] [0.9930] [0.9072] [0.9959] [0.6989] [0.9655] [0.7425]
ND00 13.88 2.04 3.41 3.21 1.52 1.23 0.37 0.06 24.71
[0.0010]*** [0.1535] [0.1817] [0.0730]* [0.4683] [0.2667] [0.8325] [0.7988] [0.0017]***
Restaurants NB00 16.08 10.43 0.06 0.06 1.96 0.22 0.28 0.27 39.44
(NACE 553) [0.0003]*** [0.0012]*** [0.9714] [0.8096] [0.3749] [0.6410] [0.8697] [0.6033] [0.0000]***
ND00 19.66 19.57 0.38 0.26 8.37 8.37 6.60 0.03 454.90
[0.0001]*** [0.0000]*** [0.8278] [0.6127] [0.0153]** [0.0038]*** [0.0368]** [0.8591] [0.0000]***
Bars & coffee-houses NB00 14.88 12.80 3.07 1.70 8.62 0.23 9.89 6.19 29.96
(NACE 554) [0.0006]*** [0.0003]*** [0.2153] [0.1922] [0.0134]** [0.6325] [0.0071]*** [0.0128]** [0.0002]***
ND00 21.29 14.72 0.43 0.28 5.09 1.01 1.96 0.00 42.08
[0.0000]*** [0.0001]*** [0.8048] [0.5945] [0.0786]* [0.3145] [0.3760] [0.9776] [0.0000]***

2(4)
Total NB00 38.04 38.02 0.08 0.00 41.08
(NACE 501, 502, 521, 522,  [0.0000]*** [0.0000]*** [0.9611] [0.9881] [0.0000]***
553, 554) ND00 46.57 44.40 2.11 1.28 48.15
[0.0000]*** [0.0000]*** [0.3487] [0.2570] [0.0000]***
[ ] : Prob-value (p.v.) of H0 ;  : p. v.  10% ;  : p. v.  5% ;  : p. v.  1%.29
Table IX. Joined tests (median low pop. density and high pop. growth, n=180)






























Trade of motor vehicles NB00 3.77 3.31 0.35 0.22 11.99 6.52 0.36 0.22 34.36
(NACE 501) [0.1518] [0.0687]* [0.8393] [0.6413] [0.0025]*** [0.0106]** [0.8356] [0.6393] [0.0000]***
ND00 0.41 0.00 5.43 0.02 5.36 3.02 3.59 0.11 14.04
[0.8157] [0.9817] [0.0663]* [0.8894] [0.0684]* [0.0821]* [0.1663] [0.7439] [0.0808]*
Repair of motor vehicles NB00  5.33 0.03 0.14 0.08 0.17 0.02 0.82 0.56 6.20
(NACE 502) [0.0694]* [0.8529] [0.9337] [0.7806] [0.9174] [0.8747] [0.6624] [0.4551] [0.6248]
ND00  1.48 0.93 1.94 0.63 0.90 0.74 0.68 0.01 5.09
[0.4770] [0.3347] [0.3798] [0.4269] [0.6383] [0.3888] [0.7100] [0.9091] [0.7481]
Unspecial. retailing trade NB00  1.12 0.99 9.43 1.52 4.16 0.01 0.65 0.15 28.28
(NACE 521) [0.5721] [0.3193] [0.0090]*** [0.2170] [0.1251] [0.9036] [0.7231] [0.7013] [0.0004]***
ND00 7.15 0.58 2.10 0.25 8.52 2.75 1.97 1.89 83.77
[0.0280]** [0.4476] [0.3503] [0.6195] [0.0141]** [0.0974]* [0.3732] [0.1689] [0.0000]***
Spec. food retailing NB00 1.78 1.76 4.82 1.89 4.61 4.46 0.79 0.50 12.62
(NACE 522) [0.4100] [0.1851] [0.0899]* [0.1691] [0.0997]* [0.0348]** [0.6744] [0.4778] [0.1257]
ND00 7.50 0.24 0.53 0.00 1.34 1.06 0.41 0.21 10.91
[0.0235]** [0.6260] [0.7684] [1.0000] [0.5108] [0.3042] [0.8130] [0.6455] [0.2066]
Restaurants NB00 7.35 5.26 0.97 0.04 0.07 0.01 1.13 1.06 13.40
(NACE 553) [0.0253]** [0.0219]** [0.6152] [0.8357] [0.9650] [0.9299] [0.5672] [0.3027] [0.0988]*
ND00 12.33 9.86 4.89 3.94 2.94 2.64 4.95 3.55 23.85
[0.0021]*** [0.0017]*** [0.0869]* [0.0470]** [0.2305] [0.1042] [0.0843]* [0.0596]* [0.0024]***
Bars & coffee-houses NB00 9.95 9.84 3.44 3.37 3.99 1.44 1.69 0.43 19.99
(NACE 554) [0.0069]*** [0.0017]*** [0.1793] [0.0663]* [0.1358] [0.2304] [0.4289] [0.5112] [0.0104]**
ND00 9.82 9.82 6.95 3.90 2.32 2.25 2.68 0.32 26.10
[0.0074]*** [0.0017]*** [0.0310]** [0.0483]** [0.3136] [0.1339] [0.2614] [0.5744] [0.0010]***

2(4)
Total NB00 16.47 15.85 0.85 0.57 16.69
(NACE 501, 502, 521, 522,  [0.0003]*** [0.0001]*** [0.6551] [0.4492] [0.0022]***
553, 554) ND00 16.38 16.17 0.50 0.47 17.87
[0.0003]*** [0.0001]*** [0.7787] [0.4920] [0.0013]***
[ ] : Prob-value (p.v.) of H0 ;  : p. v.  10% ;  : p. v.  5% ;  : p. v.  1%.30
Table X. Joined tests (median high pop. density and low pop. growth, n=180)






























Trade of motor vehicles NB00 6.21 5.56 1.12 1.12 3.09 0.01 14.42 14.14 27.57
(NACE 501) [0.0449]** [0.0184]** [0.5717] [0.2909] [0.2137] [0.9210] [0.0007]*** [0.0002]*** [0.0006]***
ND00 12.01 11.27 6.30 5.51 12.52 0.56 6.38 1.15 194.52
[0.0025]*** [0.0008]*** [0.0429]** [0.0189]** [0.0019]*** [0.4544] [0.0411]** [0.2826] [0.0000]***
Repair of motor vehicles NB00  1.64 0.83 7.73 7.24 8.17 4.22 8.76 7.52 25.33
(NACE 502) [0.4396] [0.3620] [0.0209]** [0.0071]*** [0.0168]** [0.0400]** [0.0125]** [0.0061]*** [0.0014]***
ND00  14.81 10.61 20.42 14.81 3.31 0.03 2.00 0.13 45.78
[0.0006]*** [0.0011]*** [0.0000]*** [0.0001]*** [0.1914] [0.8611] [0.3688] [0.7224 [0.0000]***
Unspecial. retailing trade NB00  16.03 12.56 11.07 8.36 8.88 2.27 0.09 0.02 102.59
(NACE 521) [0.0003]*** [0.0004]*** [0.0040]*** [0.0038]*** [0.0118]** [0.1321] [0.9577] [0.8829] [0.0000]***
ND00 3.49 2.32 0.25 0.24 0.73 0.65 0.25 0.00 586.57
[0.1743] [0.1275] [0.8831] [0.6219] [0.6927] [0.4188] [0.8838] [0.9871] [0.0000]***
Spec. food retailing NB00 9.36 8.36 7.58 5.36 1.19 1.14 4.65 1.90 41.52
(NACE 522) [0.0093]*** [0.0038]*** [0.0226]** [0.0206]** [0.5516] [0.2857] [0.0977]* [0.1681] [0.0000]***
ND00 14.72 3.31 5.36 5.35 0.48 0.44 3.73 1.18 25.76
[0.0006]*** [0.0689]* [0.0687]* [0.0207]** [0.7871] [0.5052] [0.1553] [0.2767] [0.0012]***
Restaurants NB00 20.73 7.97 7.04 5.76 1.08 1.01 2.33 0.02 52.31
(NACE 553) [0.0000]*** [0.0048]*** [0.0296]** [0.0164]** [0.5841] [0.3145] [0.3126] [0.8782] [0.0000]***
ND00 18.92 17.09 0.89 0.89 0.90 0.89 2.44 0.06 42.31
[0.0001]*** [0.0000]*** [0.6421] [0.3466] [0.6391] [0.3454] [0.2946] [0.8125] [0.0000]***
Bars & coffee-houses NB00 16.70 13.43 3.01 0.05 1.58 1.56 0.81 0.80 29.76
(NACE 554) [0.0002]*** [0.0002]*** [0.2223] [0.8220] [0.4528] [0.2116] [0.6685] [0.3697] [0.0002]***
ND00 15.33 12.32 19.53 15.87 2.26 1.30 1.87 1.17 51.29
[0.0000]*** [0.0004]*** [0.0001]*** [0.0001]*** [0.3237] [0.2533] [0.3920] [0.2786] [0.0000]***

2(4)
Total NB00 120.66 120.08 2.67 0.97 122.47
(NACE 501, 502, 521, 522,  [0.0000]*** [0.0000]*** [0.2638] [0.3258] [0.0000]***
553, 554) ND00 74.32 74.21 1.44 1.32 76.45
[0.0000]*** [0.0000]*** [0.4873] [0.2502] [0.0000]***
[ ] : Prob-value (p.v.) of H0 ;  : p. v.  10% ;  : p. v.  5% ;  : p. v.  1%.31
Table XI. Joined tests (median low pop. density and low pop. growth, n=114)






























Trade of motor vehicles NB00 4.74 4.17 6.36 5.00 20.23 15.92 14.54 0.96 77.00
(NACE 501) [0.0937]* [0.0411]** [0.0416]** [0.0253]** [0.0000]*** [0.0001]*** [0.0007]*** [0.3261] [0.0000]***
ND00 288.28 4.98 0.44 0.21 2.57 0.00 0.87 0.50 533.95
[0.0000]*** [0.0257]** [0.8020] [0.6480] [0.2771] [0.9910] [0.6472] [0.4812] [0.0000]***
Repair of motor vehicles NB00  1.33 0.29 5.45 2.59 1.33 0.39 1.55 0.46 9.61
(NACE 502) [0.5143] [0.5895] [0.0656]* [0.1073] [0.5144] [0.5312] [0.4618] [0.4966] [0.2934]
ND00  3.49 0.01 1.88 1.82 7.00 6.99 5.36 3.53 76.52
[0.1743] [0.9121] [0.3913] [0.1772] [0.0302]** [0.0082]*** [0.0685]* [0.0603]* [0.0000]***
Unspecial. retailing trade NB00  2.26 2.24 0.09 0.03 2.87 1.31 4.67 4.56 10.51
(NACE 521) [0.3225] [0.1348] [0.9547] [0.8663] [0.2385] [0.2519] [0.0968]* [0.0327]** [0.2309]
ND00 65.97 0.06 0.70 0.18 0.73 0.00 0.24 0.21 444.89
[0.0000]*** [0.8056] [0.7031] [0.6702] [0.6957] [0.9659] [0.8868] [0.6498] [0.0000]***
Spec. food retailing NB00 0.85 0.01 3.20 0.56 3.06 0.17 2.18 0.82 10.91
(NACE 522) [0.6542] [0.9036] [0.2023] [0.4549] [0.2164] [0.6822] [0.3357] [0.3642] [0.2067]
ND00 30.42 0.31 1.23 0.61 4.02 0.03 5.21 0.74 64.38
[0.0000]*** [0.5804] [0.5401] [0.4357] [0.1343] [0.8659] [0.0740]* [0.3886] [0.0000]***
Restaurants NB00 11.63 7.40 5.62 2.96 5.05 3.49 3.48 1.74 52.83
(NACE 553) [0.0030]*** [0.0065]*** [0.0601]* [0.0851]* [0.0801]* [0.0619]* [0.1751] [0.1873] [0.0000]***
ND00 9.93 2.23 0.12 0.03 4.90 0.07 1.33 0.58 31.72
[0.0070]*** [0.1350] [0.9409] [0.8538] [0.0862]* [0.7867] [0.5154] [0.4462] [0.0001]***
Bars & coffee-houses NB00 4.30 2.92 1.52 0.00 0.24 0.03 0.46 0.42 8.22
(NACE 554) [0.1166] [0.0875]* [0.4680] [0.9691] [0.8876] [0.8687] [0.7944] [0.5146] [0.4124]
ND00 15.00 1.48 7.17 2.20 0.65 0.51 0.96 0.90 22.28
[0.0006]*** [0.2231] [0.0277]** [0.1384] [0.7217] [0.4741] [0.6191] [0.3428] [0.0044]***

2(4)
Total NB00 4.73 1.49 0.07 0.00 4.74
(NACE 501, 502, 521, 522,  [0.0937]* [0.2217] [0.9662] [0.9913] [0.3146]
553, 554) ND00 10.70 8.83 1.81 0.73 11.74
[0.0047]*** [0.0030]*** [0.4049] [0.3940] [0.0194]**
[ ] : Prob-value (p.v.) of H0 ;  : p. v.  10% ;  : p. v.  5% ;  : p. v.  1%.